
A ROAROA Route Origin Authorisation: a signed RPKI object stating which AS number may announce a prefix. (Route Origin Authorization) is a signed statement: this AS may announce this prefix, up to this length. Networks that validate RPKIRPKI Resource Public Key Infrastructure: signed data about who may announce which IP space. Networks use it to reject forged routes. (route origin validation, ROV) compare every incoming route against those statements and drop what does not match. If you have just obtained your own ASN and address space, ROAs belong among the first things you set up, before your first announcement.
A ROA only helps where someone checks
The misconception is that a ROA protects you. It protects you at networks that enforce ROV, and that is far from everyone. According to Hurricane Electric's measurements, around 67% of routes had a ROA in mid-2026 (Ipregistry, citing HE). How many networks actually reject invalids is harder to measure; one peer-reviewed study put it at roughly a quarter (CACM). More recent estimates are higher, but the order of magnitude stands: a large part of the internet does not look.
In late August 2026 a /24 inside a /16 of a large German hosting company was announced by another network, long enough to get a valid TLS certificate issued for a domain in that space (account by an involved party, not independently confirmed). A more specific route always beats a less specific one. A ROA for the /16 makes such a /24 from a foreign AS Invalid, but that only helps on paths where networks enforce ROV. Elsewhere, traffic can still go the wrong way.
We validate RPKI on all sessions: a route with an invalid ROA does not enter our network. That protects your outbound traffic. Your own prefixes you protect with your own ROAs.
The steps in the dashboard
You create ROAs in the RIPE NCC RPKI dashboard (documentation):
- Log in and create a CA — with the RIPE NCC Access account linked to your LIRLIR Local Internet Registry: a RIPE NCC member that manages IP space and AS numbers and can request them for others (sponsorship).. The first time you create a hosted CA: RIPE NCC then manages the keys and signs your ROAs.
- Create a ROA from what RIPE already sees — the announcements tab shows what the route collectors see of your space. From there you create a ROA matching an existing announcement in one click.
- Or manually — on the ROAs tab, for a prefix you are about to announce.
- Batch your changes — pending changes show beforehand which existing announcements would become Invalid, and you apply everything in one go.
- Turn on alerts — the dashboard emails you daily or weekly about announcements of your space that are Invalid. Turn it on; it is the cheapest monitoring there is.
If you hold PI spacePI space Provider Independent address space: IP addresses assigned to your organisation rather than your provider, so you keep them when you switch. through a sponsoring LIR, that LIR can manage the ROAs for you or give you access to the dashboard.
maxLength: preferably empty
By default the maximum length equals the prefix length. A ROA for a /22 with maxLength 24 also permits every /23 and /24 inside it, from your AS. That looks convenient, but anyone who puts your ASN at the end of a forged path can then announce a /24 that RPKI sees as Valid. RIPE NCC therefore discourages maxLength, referring to RFC 9319. If you really announce more-specific routes, create a separate ROA for each.
More than one origin
A ROA ties a prefix to one AS. If the same prefix is announced from more than one AS, you need more ROAs, otherwise the routes from the other ASes are Invalid. Think of:
- An external DDoS scrubbing service — which announces your prefix from its own AS during an attack. Without a ROA for that AS, the diversion fails at networks enforcing ROV, exactly when you need it.
- A migration — while moving your prefix to another AS you can allow both origins for a while. Remove the old ROA once the move is done.
- Anycast from several networks — a ROA for each origin AS.
Our own network filters attacks at the edge, from our own AS (more on DDoS protection). That needs no extra ROA for your prefix.
Checking that it works
Once created, you can check the status of your routes yourself, for instance through RIPEstat or your router's RPKI tooling. If an announcement turns Invalid when you did not expect it, look at the origin and the length first. In practice it is nearly always one of the two.
RPKI and what we do
We have ROAs for all our own address space, and we enforce ROV on our sessions; how that fits into our import policy is on the technical IP transit page. If you want a LIR to keep your ROAs and database objects up to date, see LIR services. More about the offer itself is on IP transit and DDoS protection. Unsure about your current ROAs? Get in touch.