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Setting up RPKI and ROAs in the RIPE portal

16 November 20266 min read
A certificate with a seal confirming three address blocks

A ROA (Route Origin Authorization) is a signed statement: this AS may announce this prefix, up to this length. Networks that validate RPKI (route origin validation, ROV) compare every incoming route against those statements and drop what does not match. If you have just obtained your own ASN and address space, ROAs belong among the first things you set up, before your first announcement.

A ROA only helps where someone checks

The misconception is that a ROA protects you. It protects you at networks that enforce ROV, and that is far from everyone. According to Hurricane Electric's measurements, around 67% of routes had a ROA in mid-2026 (Ipregistry, citing HE). How many networks actually reject invalids is harder to measure; one peer-reviewed study put it at roughly a quarter (CACM). More recent estimates are higher, but the order of magnitude stands: a large part of the internet does not look.

In late August 2026 a /24 inside a /16 of a large German hosting company was announced by another network, long enough to get a valid TLS certificate issued for a domain in that space (account by an involved party, not independently confirmed). A more specific route always beats a less specific one. A ROA for the /16 makes such a /24 from a foreign AS Invalid, but that only helps on paths where networks enforce ROV. Elsewhere, traffic can still go the wrong way.

We validate RPKI on all sessions: a route with an invalid ROA does not enter our network. That protects your outbound traffic. Your own prefixes you protect with your own ROAs.

The steps in the dashboard

You create ROAs in the RIPE NCC RPKI dashboard (documentation):

  • Log in and create a CA — with the RIPE NCC Access account linked to your LIR. The first time you create a hosted CA: RIPE NCC then manages the keys and signs your ROAs.
  • Create a ROA from what RIPE already sees — the announcements tab shows what the route collectors see of your space. From there you create a ROA matching an existing announcement in one click.
  • Or manually — on the ROAs tab, for a prefix you are about to announce.
  • Batch your changes — pending changes show beforehand which existing announcements would become Invalid, and you apply everything in one go.
  • Turn on alerts — the dashboard emails you daily or weekly about announcements of your space that are Invalid. Turn it on; it is the cheapest monitoring there is.

If you hold PI space through a sponsoring LIR, that LIR can manage the ROAs for you or give you access to the dashboard.

maxLength: preferably empty

By default the maximum length equals the prefix length. A ROA for a /22 with maxLength 24 also permits every /23 and /24 inside it, from your AS. That looks convenient, but anyone who puts your ASN at the end of a forged path can then announce a /24 that RPKI sees as Valid. RIPE NCC therefore discourages maxLength, referring to RFC 9319. If you really announce more-specific routes, create a separate ROA for each.

More than one origin

A ROA ties a prefix to one AS. If the same prefix is announced from more than one AS, you need more ROAs, otherwise the routes from the other ASes are Invalid. Think of:

  • An external DDoS scrubbing service — which announces your prefix from its own AS during an attack. Without a ROA for that AS, the diversion fails at networks enforcing ROV, exactly when you need it.
  • A migration — while moving your prefix to another AS you can allow both origins for a while. Remove the old ROA once the move is done.
  • Anycast from several networks — a ROA for each origin AS.

Our own network filters attacks at the edge, from our own AS (more on DDoS protection). That needs no extra ROA for your prefix.

Checking that it works

Once created, you can check the status of your routes yourself, for instance through RIPEstat or your router's RPKI tooling. If an announcement turns Invalid when you did not expect it, look at the origin and the length first. In practice it is nearly always one of the two.

RPKI and what we do

We have ROAs for all our own address space, and we enforce ROV on our sessions; how that fits into our import policy is on the technical IP transit page. If you want a LIR to keep your ROAs and database objects up to date, see LIR services. More about the offer itself is on IP transit and DDoS protection. Unsure about your current ROAs? Get in touch.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What happens to my routes if I have no ROA?

They are NotFound, not Invalid. Networks that validate RPKI let NotFound through; only Invalid is dropped. Without a ROA you are reachable, but someone else can announce your prefix without a validating network seeing the difference.

My provider already validates RPKI. Do I still need to do anything?

Yes. Validation protects your provider's customers against other people's bad routes. Whether your own prefixes are protected depends on your ROAs. They are two sides of the same system, and each side has its own owner.

What does "ROA exists but prefix not seen in DFZ" mean?

That a ROA exists for a prefix nobody is currently announcing on the internet. Harmless in itself, for example for space you have reserved for later. But a forgotten ROA for a prefix you no longer use still allows that prefix to be announced from your old AS. Clean those up.

Answer not found?

Ask an engineer directly — we usually respond within one business day.